But, by default, BitLocker recovery keys are uploaded to Microsoft’s cloud, allowing the tech giant — and by extension law enforcement — to access them and use them to decrypt drives encrypted with BitLocker, as with the case reported by Forbes.
I mean it’s dumb to sync but at same time it’s not like MS isn’t great at either making it almost impossible to not sync it re-enable syncing for a bit after updates.
You can constantly tell it not to sync but all it takes is MS saying we want it now and they’ll get it
Whats dumb is this issue is very easily resolved by encrypting the users security pin or password against the bitlocker keys and then only storing that.
or better yet have the pin/password an isolated thing from the microsoft system, so when a key gets uploaded, it requests the recovery pin, and if the pin matches it uploads, otherwise it states invalid pin and offers to change it while warning that it will remove existing keys, then optionally next time a system whom contains a drive with an identifier (which wouldn’t need to be encrypted only the key) goes online, it can prompt the user “note: due to recovery pin, drive X recovery key needs to be backed up again, would you like to do so?”
This type of system would make it so the only data MS has stored is the already encrypted recovery key, and as such would mean that the data they gave law enforcement would be worthless.
I mean it’s dumb to sync but at same time it’s not like MS isn’t great at either making it almost impossible to not sync it re-enable syncing for a bit after updates.
You can constantly tell it not to sync but all it takes is MS saying we want it now and they’ll get it
Whats dumb is this issue is very easily resolved by encrypting the users security pin or password against the bitlocker keys and then only storing that.
or better yet have the pin/password an isolated thing from the microsoft system, so when a key gets uploaded, it requests the recovery pin, and if the pin matches it uploads, otherwise it states invalid pin and offers to change it while warning that it will remove existing keys, then optionally next time a system whom contains a drive with an identifier (which wouldn’t need to be encrypted only the key) goes online, it can prompt the user “note: due to recovery pin, drive X recovery key needs to be backed up again, would you like to do so?”
This type of system would make it so the only data MS has stored is the already encrypted recovery key, and as such would mean that the data they gave law enforcement would be worthless.